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This paper studies the growth and fiscal policy implications of the assumption that public
policy generates an externality in the individual rate of time preference through the
aggregate public capital stock. We examine the competitive equilibrium properties and we
solve for endogenous growth–maximizing fiscal policy. We investigate the behavior of the
government size and the growth rate to the sensitivity of time preference to public capital
and the magnitude of public capital externality on production. We find that the Barro
taxation rule [Barro, Robert J., Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990), 103–125], which
states that the elasticity of public capital in the production function should equal the
government size, is suboptimal. We show that the government does not necessarily have to
increase income taxation following a rise in public capital intensity because of the
externality of public capital on time preference and, in turn, on growth and the tax base of
the economy.
Keywords: Endogenous Time Preference, Public Capital Externalities,
Growth-Maximizing Fiscal Policies
1. INTRODUCTION
Can the patience of agents in an economy be determined by public policy? Ca-
sual empiricism and microeconomic evidence suggest that schooling and health,
which are mainly provided by the public sector, strongly affect patience by ren-
dering agents less impulsive to choices that tend to over-weight rewards in close
temporal proximity. Lawrance (1991) found that nonwhite families without a col-
lege education have time preference rates that are about seven percentage points
higher than those of white families. Similarly, Harrison et al. (2002) showed for a
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sample of Danish households that highly educated adults have subjective discount
rates that are roughly two-thirds those of adults who are less educated. Bauer
and Chytilova (2010) report that an additional year of schooling in Ugandan
villages lowered the discount rate significantly.1 In this vein, Becker and Mulligan
(1997) emphasized that expenditures on “future-oriented capital,” like health and
education, focus agents’ attention to the future, and they thus tend to be more
patient and increase savings. This point goes back to Strotz (1956), who had
noticed that discount functions are formed by teaching and social environment.
A prominent illustration of this argument concerns the causes of the high savings
rate observed in Japan during the past few decades, attributed by Horioka (1990)
and Sheldon (1997, 1998) to, among other factors, an array of public policies
implemented through educational programs that promoted the virtues of patience
and thrift.2 In the present paper, we assume that the publicly provided productive
input (public capital in the form of education or health) reduces the subjective
discount rate and we show that the growth-maximizing Barro (1990) taxation
rule, which states that the output elasticity of public capital should equal the
government size, is altered. The government size does not necessarily have to
increase following a rise in public capital intensity because of the external effect
of public capital on time preference and, in turn, on growth and the tax base of the
economy.
Up to now, several studies have analyzed the implications of endogenous time
preference for the macroeconomy. Uzawa (1968), Obstfeld (1990), Shin and
Epstein (1993), Drugeon (1996, 2000), Palivos et al. (1997), Stern (2006), and
Chen (2007) have investigated the effects of individual decisions on the time
preference rate. These authors have shown that the endogeneity of time preference
is crucial for the dynamics of the economy, the existence of long-run growth, the
long-run distribution of capital, and the analysis of income divergence between
countries. Epstein and Hynes (1983) and Meng (2006) have endogenized the rate
of time preference as a function of the aggregate macroeconomic environment,
captured by aggregate consumption and income, in many variants of exogenous
and endogenous growth models.
Yet little is known about the growth implications of fiscal policy when time
preference is endogenously determined by public policies. In the present study,
we introduce the assumption that individual patience is affected by the levels
of aggregate consumption and public capital into an otherwise standard general
equilibrium framework in order to assess the impact of growth-maximizing fiscal
policy. To this end, we first analyze the steady-state properties of the model
under the assumption of endogenous impatience as a result of public policy and
we solve for endogenous growth-maximizing fiscal policy. Following Turnovsky
(2000), the government sustains output growth by setting expenditures on public
policy as a constant output share that is financed by a tax rate on individual
output (government size). We show that the optimal government size in a second-
best growth-maximizing environment depends not only on the technological pa-
rameters of the economy, but also on the endogeneity of time preference. This
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changes the growth-maximizing rule presented by, among others, Barro (1990),
Futagami et al. (1993), and Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), which states that the
government share in output should equal the elasticity of public capital in the pro-
duction function. In particular, the marginal cost of government revenues decreases
due to the positive external effect of public capital on the rate of time preference
and growth. Our comparative statics exercises regarding standard parameters of
growth theory then show how the optimal government size and the growth rate can
differ according to the magnitude of the response of time preference to changes in
public capital.
Our findings have some novel policy implications for economic performance,
as active public policies in sectors such as health and education are considered
crucial in boosting growth. Standard analysis with exogenous time preference has
indicated that an increase in public capital intensity increases the allocation of
resources to public capital and raises the marginal cost of taxation and thus the
optimal government size [Barro (1990)]. However, under the additional external
effect of public policies on time preference, the effect on government size depends
on the level of public capital intensity and the sensitivity of time preference.
Specifically, we show that when the sensitivity of time preference is high the
government, following a rise in public capital intensity, may lower rather than raise
taxation in order to maximize growth. This happens because of the positive external
effect on growth and the tax base, which outweighs the associated marginal cost
of taxation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up and solves
the optimization problem for households and firms and studies the steady-state
properties of the decentralized economy. Section 3 analyzes the role of growth-
maximizing fiscal policy, and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. THE COMPETITIVE DECENTRALIZED EQUILIBRIUM
2.1. The Basic Model
Consider an economy with a large and constant number of infinitely lived agents,
normalized to unity, that consume a single good. Each household seeks to maxi-
mize intertemporal discounted utility, given by
∫ ∞
0
u(ct ) exp
[
−
∫ t
0
ρ(Cv,Kg,v) dv
]
dt, (1)
with instantaneous utility function u(ct ) = ln(ct ), subject to the initial asset
endowment A(0) > 0 and the income resource constraint3
A˙ = rA + wl − c, (2)
where A denotes household financial assets, c denotes individual consumption,
l denotes inelastic labor supply, and r and w denote the market interest rate
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and the wage rate, respectively. The formulation of intertemporal utility in (1)
follows Meng (2006) and implies that the subjective discount rate, ρ(·, ·), is not
a positive constant, as in standard growth theory, but is endogenously determined
and depends on the economywide average level of consumption, Cv , and the
average public capital stock, Kg,v , at time v.
We assume that the time preference function has the following properties:
Assumption 1. ρ(C,Kg) ≥ ρˇ > 0.
Assumption 2. ρ ′C ≥ 0 and ρ ′Kg ≤ 0.
Assumption 3. ρ(C,Kg) = ρ(C/Kg).
Assumption 1 shows that the rate of time preference is strictly positive, implying
that there exists a lower bound denoted by ρˇ. By Assumption 2, the rate of
time preference depends positively on the level of aggregate consumption and
negatively on the level of aggregate public capital.4 As in the rest of the literature
with endogenous time preference, we assume that as agents consume more, the
value of current consumption increases. We additionally assume that the higher
the public capital stock in the economy, the more patient is the agent and the more
willing to forego current consumption.5 Last, Assumption 3 implies homogeneity
of the rate of time preference to the ratio of consumption to public capital stock,
which is required for the rate of time preference to be bounded at the steady state
[Palivos et al. (1997); Meng (2006)] and for the utility function to be consistent
with balanced growth [Dolmas (1996)].
Notice that because these assumptions generally imply a variable time pref-
erence rate, they should be accompanied by a commitment technology. As is
well known [Laibson (1997)], the optimality condition for the consumer will not
hold under, say, hyperbolic discounting because the household has to figure out
how consumption setting at time t will alter its capital stock and hence future
consumption choices. Barro (1999) has shown that a time-varying discount rate
can be incorporated into the standard Ramsey model with logarithmic utility even
without commitment.6
On the supply side of the economy we assume the existence of a continuum
of perfectly competitive homogeneous firms, normalized to unity, that seek to
maximize profits. Each firm i uses private capital, Ki , and labor, Li , with the
following production technology:
Yi = Kai
(
Kg
L
Li
)1−a
, (3)
where 0 < a < 1 denotes the share of private capital in the production function,
L denotes the aggregate labor force, Yi denotes individual output, and Kg denotes
the public capital stock that affects positively the productivity of labor. The first-
order conditions of the firms’ profit maximization problem are given by r =
(1 − g)a(Ki/KgLi)a−1 − δk and w = (1 − g)(1 − a)(Ki/Li)aK1−ag and state
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that the marginal productivity of capital and labor have to equal the respective
factor prices. As can readily be seen, the public capital stock, introduced here in
the form of health and education expenditures, affects the marginal productivity
of labor positively [Glomm and Ravikumar (1997, 1998); Strauss and Thomas
(1998)].
The laws of motion for the private and public capital stocks are given by
K˙i = Ii − δKKi (4)
K˙g = G − δgKg, (5)
where Ii and δK denote private investment and the private capital depreciation
rate, and G and δg denote public expenditures and the public capital depreciation
rate, respectively. Following Turnovsky (2000), we assume that the government
sets its expenditures as a fixed fraction of output, g,
G = gY, (6)
in order to sustain ongoing growth by maintaining a balance between the rate of
public investment and the size of the economy. Hence, an expansion of government
expenditures is parameterized by an increase in the chosen policy parameter, g.
2.2. Balanced Growth
We can now define the competitive decentralized equilibrium (CDE) of the econ-
omy in order to analyze its properties.
DEFINITION 1. The CDE of the economy is defined for the exogenous policy
instrument, g, factor prices r , w, and aggregate allocations K , Kg , L, C, such
that
(i) Individuals solve their intertemporal utility maximization problem by choosing c
and A, given g and factor prices.
(ii) Firms choose L
i
and K
i
in order to maximize their profits, given factor prices and
aggregate allocations.
(iii) All markets clear and in the capital market we have that total assets hold by the
agents have to be equal to the total capital stock in the economy, A
∫ 1
0 Li =
∫ 1
0 Ki .
(iv) The government budget constraint holds.
The CDE is then defined by (i)–(iii) under the aggregation conditions ∫ 10 Ki =
K ,
∫ 1
0 Li = L.
The growth rate of per capita consumption, c, in the CDE is given by
c˙
c
=
[
r − ρ
(
C
Kg
)]
. (7)
Using the equilibrium conditions for homogeneous and symmetric firms Li = L
and Ki = K , and assuming for the rest of the paper without loss of generality
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that δK = δKg = δ, the equilibrium growth rates of aggregate consumption and
aggregate private and public capital stocks are given by the following system of
equations:
C˙
C
= a(1 − g)
(
K
Kg
)a−1
− ρ
(
C
Kg
)
− δ, (8)
K˙
K
= (1 − g)
(
K
Kg
)a−1
− C
K
− δ, (9)
K˙g
Kg
= g
(
K
Kg
)a
− δ. (10)
Equations (8)–(10) summarize the dynamics of our economy. The transversality
condition for this problem is given by
lim
t→∞
K(t)
C(t)
e−ρ(C(t)/Kg(t))t = 0. (11)
On the balanced growth path (BGP) consumption, private capital, and public
capital grow at the same rate, C˙/C = K˙/K = K˙g/Kg = φCDE.7 To derive the
equilibrium growth rate of the economy we first define the auxiliary stationary
variables ω ≡ C/K and z ≡ K/Kg . It is straightforward to show that the dynamics
of (8)–(10) is equivalent to the dynamics of the following system of equations:
ω˙
ω
= (a − 1)(1 − g)za−1 + ω − ρ(zω), (12)
z˙
z
= (1 − g)za−1 − ω − gza. (13)
We can now determine the properties (existence and uniqueness) of the BGP on
which ω˙/ω = z˙/z = 0. In the Appendix we show that the BGP of the economy is
unique and, for given parameter values and policy instruments, is given by
φCDE = g(z¯)a − δ, (14)
provided that there exists z¯ > 0 : (z¯) = a(1 − g)z¯a−1 − gz¯a − ρ(z¯ · ω¯(z¯)) = 0
and ω¯(z¯) = (1 − g)z¯a−1 − gz¯a > 0, where ω¯ and z¯ are the steady-state values of
ω and z, respectively.
In the next section we analyze growth-maximizing fiscal policy rules when the
rate of time preference depends on public policy.
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3. GROWTH-MAXIMIZING FISCAL POLICY
In this section we endogenize public policy as summarized by the government
size. By choosing policy given the CDE conditions, the government controls
for externalities and raises funds accordingly to finance public policy. We focus
here on second-best growth-maximizing policy, as modern growth theory has
shown particular interest in growth-enhancing policies, in order to identify the
relative merits and synergies of government interventions in areas such as the
formation and allocation of public capital. Moreover, the growth rate is usually
the main measurable objective of the government and hence it is useful to assess the
contribution of the components of public capital expenditures aiming at long-run
growth [Devarajan et al. (1996)].8
DEFINITION 2. A growth-maximizing allocation in the CDE is given under
Definition 1 when (i) the government acts as a Stackelberg player and chooses g in
order to maximize the long-run growth rate of the economy by taking into account
the aggregate maximizing behavior of the competitive equilibrium, and (ii) the
government budget constraints and the feasibility and technological conditions
are met.
The government seeks to maximize the growth rate of the economy, φ, given
by
max
g,z
φ = gza − δ,
subject to the equilibrium CDE response summarized by a(1 − g)za−1 − gza −
ρ(ω(z)z) = 0 and ω(z) = (1 − g)za−1 − gza .
The first-order conditions with respect to z and g are
agˆzˆa−1 + ˆλa(a − 1)(1 − gˆ)zˆa−2 − ˆλgˆazˆa−1 − ˆλρ ′(·)
× [a(1 − gˆ)zˆa−1 − (a + 1)gˆzˆa] = 0, (15)
zˆa − a ˆλzˆa−1 − ˆλzˆa + ˆλρ ′(·)(zˆa + zˆa+1) = 0, (16)
where ˆλ is the associated Lagrange multiplier, zˆ is the growth-maximizing private-
to-public capital ratio, and gˆ is the growth-maximizing government share in output.
Solving (16) for ˆλ and substituting in (15), we can obtain the following growth-
maximizing policy rules.
PROPOSITION 1. Under endogenous time preference with respect to public
capital, the growth-maximizing government share in output is different from the
elasticity of public capital in the production function and is given by
gˆ = a[1 − a + ρ
′(·)zˆ]
a + ρ ′(·)zˆ2 > 0, (17)
a(1 − gˆ)zˆa−1 − gˆzˆa − ρ[ω(zˆ)zˆ] = 0. (18)
Proof. See the Appendix.
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TABLE 1. Changes in b and growth-
maximizing allocation
b φ gˆ zˆ ωˆ ρˆ
0.2 0.312 0.545 0.382 0.400 0.031
0.4 0.298 0.579 0.310 0.432 0.055
0.6 0.285 0.607 0.262 0.456 0.072
1 0.266 0.649 0.201 0.491 0.100
1.4 0.251 0.679 0.165 0.515 0.120
1.8 0.238 0.702 0.140 0.533 0.135
10 0.138 0.847 0.037 0.634 0.235
Notes: a = 0.5, δ = 0.025, ρˇ = 0.001.
Proposition 1 yields the growth-maximizing government size, gˆ, as a function
of parameters through the system of equations (17) and (18) with two unknowns,
zˆ and gˆ. It can be easily verified that when the rate of time preference is constant
[ρ ′(·) = 0], the government share in output should equal the elasticity of publicly
provided public capital in the production function (1 − a), as in Barro (1990).
However, for endogenous time preference with respect to public policy, the growth-
maximizing government size does not depend only on the parameters of the
production technology as in Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993), and Glomm and
Ravikumar (1997), but also on demand-driven parameters.
The main mechanism that drives the result of Proposition 1 is that the endogene-
ity, of time preference changes the marginal cost of public funds. An increase in gˆ
not only affects growth by increasing public capital expenditures and decreasing
private capital, but also impacts the steady-state rate of time preference, which
through the Euler equation directly affects the growth rate and thus the tax base.
So public policies implemented on the basis of the technology parameters of the
economy become suboptimal when time preference is determined by fiscal policy.
Due to the complexity of the system, and without loss of generality, we adopt
a linear specification of the impatience function as in Meng (2006) and present
numerical results in order to analyze the sensitivity of growth-maximizing fiscal
policy to the endogeneity of time preference. In particular, we introduce a linear
impatience function given by ρ(K/Kg) = bC/Kg+ ρˇ, where b > 0 denotes the
slope of the impatience function and measures the response of the rate of time
preference to the ratio of aggregate consumption to public capital.9 Our aim is first
to investigate how the sensitivity of time preference affects the growth rate and the
optimal government size, gˆ. Next, we analyze the response of the growth rate and
fiscal policy following a change of the public capital intensity in the production
function to allow comparisons with standard literature.
Table 1 gives the response of the optimal government size, the growth rate,
and other endogenous variables following a change in b. Verifying Proposition
1, the growth-maximizing government size is higher than the elasticity of public
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capital in production, 1 − a, because the increase in government size not only
affects growth through the share of tax-financed public capital in production but
also impacts growth by increasing the rate of time preference. Thus, in order for
the marginal benefit of public funds to equal their cost, the optimal government
share, gˆ, has to be higher than 1 − a. An increase in b leads to an increase in gˆ
and the rate of time preference, and to a decrease in the growth rate and in the
private-to-public capital ratio. Intuitively, an increase in the slope of the impatience
function increases ceteris paribus the rate of time preference, which lowers savings
and capital accumulation and in turn decreases the private-to-public capital ratio.
Also, by the Euler equation, an increase in the rate of time preference lowers the
growth rate and the tax base of the economy, and thus requires an endogenous
increase in gˆ to finance public expenditures at the BGP.
Table 2 provides the response of the growth rate, the growth-maximizing govern-
ment size, and other endogenous variables to increases in public capital elasticity
for different values of b. For comparison purposes, the upper panel of Table 2
presents the results for the case of exogenous time preference, in which the
growth-maximizing government size equals the elasticity of public capital in the
production function. As the elasticity of public capital increases, public capital
becomes more productive and it is optimal to allocate resources to public capital
formation, which in turn lowers the ratio of private to public capital, z [see Table 2,
column (4)]. By the Euler equation (8), as z decreases, the market interest rate
increases and, thus, the growth rate increases. On the other hand, the marginal
cost of public capital funds increases due to the decline in private savings and,
as in Barro (1990), the optimal government size increases monotonically [see
Table 2, column (3)]. The rise in government size lowers the after-tax market
interest rate and the growth rate falls. Thus, the effect on the maximized growth
rate is ambiguous when the rate of time preference is exogenous. For instance,
when the elasticity of public capital is low, the private capital stock is relatively
more productive and the negative growth effect from the decline in private savings
is higher than the positive growth effect from the increase in public capital. Hence,
under constant time preference, the optimal government size always increases
following a rise in the elasticity of public capital in production, whereas the
maximized growth rate exhibits a U-shaped pattern.
The middle and lower panels of Table 2 present the results when the rate of time
preference is endogenized for relatively low and high time preference elasticities,
b = 1 and 10, respectively. In contrast to previous analysis, an increase in public
capital intensity increases the growth rate of the economy for any value of b,
whereas the effect on the growth-maximizing government size, gˆ, is not always
monotonic. In particular, as public capital intensity increases, the allocation of
resources to public capital formation rises and the rate of time preference falls,
thus triggering an additional increase in the growth rate. Regarding the response
of the optimal government size, for a relatively low value of the elasticity-of-time
preference function (b = 1), the positive effect of the rise in public capital intensity
on gˆ is preserved because the additional marginal benefit from the increase in the
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TABLE 2. Changes in 1 − a and growth-
maximizing allocation
1 − a φ gˆ zˆ ωˆ ρˆ
b = 0 (exogenous time preference)
0.2 0.481 0.2 3.193 0.127 0.001
0.3 0.397 0.3 1.629 0.182 0.001
0.4 0.349 0.4 0.897 0.251 0.001
0.5 0.328 0.5 0.498 0.355 0.001
0.6 0.329 0.6 0.265 0.532 0.001
0.7 0.353 0.7 0.128 0.885 0.001
0.8 0.414 0.8 0.049 1.76 0.001
b = 1
0.2 0.287 0.535 0.509 0.218 0.112
0.3 0.266 0.566 0.388 0.284 0.111
0.4 0.260 0.603 0.286 0.367 0.106
0.5 0.266 0.648 0.201 0.491 0.099
0.6 0.286 0.701 0.131 0.698 0.092
0.7 0.326 0.761 0.075 1.101 0.084
0.8 0.399 0.829 0.034 2.063 0.073
b = 10
0.2 0.073 0.836 0.068 0.180 0.125
0.3 0.087 0.834 0.057 0.276 0.159
0.4 0.108 0.838 0.046 0.416 0.196
0.5 0.137 0.846 0.036 0.633 0.235
0.6 0.179 0.859 0.027 1.00 0.271
0.7 0.242 0.878 0.018 1.69 0.277
0.8 0.340 0.903 0.010 3.22 0.351
Notes: δ = 0.025, ρˇ = 0.001.
growth rate cannot outweigh the induced increase in the marginal cost. However,
for high responsiveness of time preference (b = 10) and for sufficiently low values
of 1−a (ranging between 0.2 and 0.4), the increasing marginal cost of public funds
is outweighed by the increase in the growth rate and the tax base of the economy.
Hence, when b is high, an increase in public capital intensity that increases public
capital lowers the rate of time preference to a great extent. This, in turn, fuels
growth and increases the tax base, and a smaller government size is required to
finance public capital expenditures. Moreover, when 1 − a is relatively low, the
public capital stock is relatively scarce and its marginal value is high. A rise in
1 − a therefore induces a smaller increase in its marginal cost, and the required
increase in the optimal government size is low. Thus, in economies where the rate
of time preference responds strongly to changes in the public capital stock and
the elasticity of public capital in the production function is low, the government
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can benefit from the additional effect on growth and impose a lower optimal
government size following a rise in the elasticity of public capital.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper studied the macroeconomic implications of the endogeneity of time
preference with respect to publicly provided capital stock. We examined the steady-
state dynamics of the economy and analyzed the impact of growth-maximizing
fiscal policy. We showed that the growth-maximizing government size depends on
the endogeneity of time preference, as the marginal cost of government revenues
decreases due to the positive external effect of public capital on the rate of time
preference and growth. Our comparative statics exercises regarding standard pa-
rameters of growth theory challenge the standard fiscal policy rules in the growth
literature and show that their qualitative properties depend on the effect of public
policy on time preference. As shown in our numerical results, the government
does not necessarily have to increase income taxation following a rise in the
output elasticity of public capital because of the external effect of public capital
on time preference and, in turn, on growth and the tax base of the economy.
In this vein, the empirical assessment of the magnitude of the linkage between
individual time preference and the social level of health and education seems
an important task for future research. Existing studies that have investigated
the determinants of time preference empirically at the country level, surveyed
by Becker and Mulligan (1997), normally indicate that wealth, which is higher
in healthier and more educated societies, is positively associated with patience.
However, there is no cross-country evidence on the magnitude of time preference
or its association with public policies. It appears therefore that further empirical
analysis of the determinants of the rate of time preference, which will take into
account the role of aggregate health status and education, is warranted.
Our analysis has treated public expenditures on health and education in a unified
manner. Yet, as shown, for instance, by Blankenau and Simpson (2004), expen-
ditures on public education can have adverse effects on growth due to general
equilibrium adjustments. Similarly, Aisa and Pueyo (2006) have shown that an
intense positive effect of public health expenditure on life expectancy, saving, and
growth could offset the effect of taking away resources from investment. Future
work on the endogeneity of time preference with respect to public policy can
therefore address the macroeconomic impact of investment reallocation between
sectoral public expenditures, as well as the corresponding effects of differential
forms of taxation.
NOTES
1. Fuchs (1982) first provided empirical evidence on the links between time preference, health
status, and schooling. Other studies by Shoda et al. (1990), Olsen (1993), van der Pol and Cairns
(2000), Lazaro et al. (2001), Kirby et al. (2002), Khwaja et al. (2007), Asenso-Boadi et al. (2008), and
Chao et al. (2009) have also reported that education and health affect patience.
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2. Regarding health, Chakraborty (2004) and Hashimoto and Tabata (2005) provide evidence on
the impact of public health expenditures on individual time horizons and analyze their effects in
overlapping-generations models.
3. Throughout the rest of the paper, the time subscript t is omitted for simplicity of notation.
4. We retain the equality sign in our assumptions to allow, first, comparisons with the case of
constant rate of time preference and, second, the impatience function to be consistent with a balanced
growth path, along which the time preference is constant.
5. Agenor (2006, 2008) adopts a similar assumption in order to study the optimal allocation of
public expenditures. Notice that this effect has also been embodied in some overlapping-generations
models with endogenous longevity or mortality through the impact of health expenditures on the
expected individual lifespan; see, for instance, Chakraborty (2004) and Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007).
6. We thank a referee for pointing out the connection between variable time preference and com-
mitment.
7. This result can easily be obtained by investigating the equilibrium growth rates of these variables
separately. In particular, for the steady-state consumption growth rate, given by (8), to be constant both
K and Kg have to grow at the same constant rate, say φCDEK = φCDEKg = φCDE. Because the steady-state
ratio of private to public capital will be constant, the equilibrium growth rate of consumption, φCDEC ,
will be constant too. Thus, by inspection of (9), for the growth rate of physical capital to be constant
we need that φCDEK = φCDEKg and φCDEC = φCDEK (for K/Kg and C/K to be constant, respectively).
These conditions imply that φCDEC = φCDEK = φCDEKg = φCDE, which also satisfies (10) as well as the
transversality condition (11).
8. Lau (1995), Greiner and Hanusch (1998), Economides et al. (2007), and Misch et al. (2008) have
analyzed the welfare and growth effects of fiscal policy in endogenous growth models. Mourmouras
and Lee (1999) and Tanaka (2002) have examined the growth-maximizing effects of government
spending on infrastructure in an OLG setup.
9. Notice that the qualitative results presented below are not sensitive to the assumption of a linear
time preference function.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS OF EQUATION (14)
AND PROPOSITION 1
Proof of (14). To prove the uniqueness of (14), we will separate function (z) into
two functions and find their intersection to solve it. We define (z) ≡ a(1 − g)za−1 − zag
and (z) ≡ ρ[(z · ω(z))], which are both continuous in z. For ω(z) > 0 to hold we must
have z < (1 − g)/g.
Equation (z) has the following properties: ∂(z)/∂z< 0, ∂2(z)/∂z2 > 0,
limz→0 (z) = +∞, limz→1−g/g (z) = a(1 − g)[(1 − g)/g]a−1 − [(1 − g)/g]ag =
[(1 − g)/g]a[(1 − g)ag/(1 − g)− g] = [(1 − g)/g]ag(a − 1) < 0. From the properties of
(z) it follows that it is a strictly decreasing and convex function in its domain, starts from
+∞, and ends at (a − 1)(1 − g)ag1−a .
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Equation (z) has the following properties: ∂(z)/∂z = ρ ′(.)[a(1 − g)za−1 − g(1 +
a)za], limz→0 (z) = ρ(0) = ρˇ, limz→1−g/g (z) = ρ(0) = ρˇ. In turn, we have
∂(z)/∂z > 0 for a(1 − g)za−1 − (1 + a)gza > 0 ⇒ z < a(1 − g)/(1 + a)g
and ∂(z)/∂z < 0 for z > a(1 − g)/(1 + a)g. Thus, (z) has a maximum at
z = a(1 − g)/(1 + a)g. From the properties of (z), it follows that it is an inverse
U-shaped curve starting from ρˇ and ending at ρˇ.
Assuming equilibrium existence, the properties of (z) and (z) indicate that there
exists a unique equilibrium growth rate. For low values of z, because +∞ > ρˇ, we get that
(z) lies above (z). Also, for the upper bound value of z, (z) = (a−1)(1−g)ag1−a and
(z) = ρˇ. Because both functions are continuous if (a−1)(1−g)ag1−a < ρˇ, which means
that (z) ends below (z), because (z) starts above (z), (z) will cross (z) once and
thus there will exist a unique equilibrium growth rate. Thus, (a − 1)(1 − g)ag1−a < ρˇ
is a sufficient parametric condition for a unique equilibrium growth rate in the economy
and exists for any parameter value in the assumed domain because (a − 1) < 0 ⇒
(a − 1)(1 − g)ag1−a < 0 < ρˇ. 
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove Proposition 1 by contradiction. From (17), let
gˆ = [a(1 − a + ρ ′(·)zˆ)]/[a + ρ ′(·)zˆ2] = 1 − a. This holds if a[1 − a + ρ ′(·)zˆ] =
(1 − a)[a + ρ ′(·)zˆ2] ⇒ 1 − a + ρ ′(·)zˆ = 1 − a + [(1 − a)/a]ρ ′(·)zˆ2 ⇒ ρ ′(·)zˆ =
[(1 − a)/a]ρ ′(·)zˆ2 ⇒ [(1 − a)/a]zˆ = 1 ⇒ zˆ = a/(1 − a) (Condition 1). We know that
for an interior solution to exist in the CDE we must have that zˆ < (1 − g)/g. Thus, for
gˆ = 1−a, the condition for interior solution implies that zˆ < a/(1−a), which contradicts
Condition 1. 
